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INTRODITaTIOH.
The words retros,ective ans retroactive although
literally construed convey a diffevent meaning, are use, in-
tei-chan .ealy by t-,e courts in rel'errinr to legislative acts
which are made to op:erait, upon some subject, contract or crime
wl ich exist, J before T-e r assage o.' the act. SIc legisla-
tion has been severely criticize by eminent authorities,
but there are cases in which laws may justly and for th-e ben-
efit of the community and also of iniividuals relate to a
time antecedent to th eir commencement. This is ti- e class
which we shall deal with in this article.
Th.e Constitution of the United States provides
that no state shall Ilass any law impairing, the obligatious
of contracts or ex post facto law. These of course are
Two classes of retroactive laws that are exvressly Irohibitel
and all such are therefore void. Put as to all other laws
of a retroactive nature the states have a perfect right to
enact provided they do not violate some other principle of
constitutional law protecting vested ri;-hts. Some of
the states, however, have seen fit to expressly prohibit
in their constitutions, the passage of all retroactive laws
of whatsoever nature. Such is the case in the constitutions
of New Ilampsh-iire, Ohio, rPennuec, Texas, and perhaps some
others.
CONSTRUCTIO7,4 !'T ' - ' ' .. '
Tn construing statutes tIe courts always give thor
a prospective effect unless the legislative intent)that they
shall act retrospectively, is exrressed in clear and unam-
biguous terms, or such, intent is necessarily implied from
the language of the statute, wh ich would be inoperative
ot}herwise than retrospecTively. Tn Dash v. VanCluck,
V Johns 506, the validity of retrospective laws underwent an
able consideration anti the iudges unanimously agreed as to
the propriety of construing a statute in prevention of
having a retrospective operation, if the court were not re-
strained by expressions explicit and. unequivocal. This
doctrine is well sustained by modern authorities. TYnowl-
ton v. RedenbauTh, 40 Iowa, 114. Tn the case of thie city
of Tlizabe bi against HJill, 39 N.J.Law '565, Depew j. said:
uThe effort of the courts is always to give statutes a
prosrective effect only, unless tl-e language is so clear
and imperative as not to admit of doubt". -ut when a
retroactive statute has escaped the strictness of oonstrlu-
tion of the courts) as to the in-tet of the logislature,
and does riot violate any constitutional 1 rohibition, aniJ is
noT found contrary to tle fundramental princi]-les of 1he
isocial compact, it is aboVe the province of the judicial
department to say) that it shall not be a law. Accor-ing
to this fundamental principle of (;onstruction, statutes in
which the le;-islative intent is expressed in language so
broad in its literal extent as to comprehend existing eases,
will not be construed as embracing them unless such intenition
is so clearly manifest as to remove all doubt, or unless
such constr'uction is necessary in order to give the legisla-
tive act any meaning whatever. This rule of construction
is applicable to state constitutions as well as to legisla-
tive acts, and in fact to every conceivable expression of the
will of the law-making power)where there is a doubt qs to
whether it was intended to act prospectively or retrospect-
ively. Indiana County v. Agricultural Society, 8.- Pa. St.
3b'7. 'Put in !:'Yigland where tl ere are no constitutional
restrictions upon the legislative power, and the quostion
whether an act of parliament is retrospective in ints effect
is rurely one of construction, there seems to be a g-reater
degree of reluctance on the part of the courts to enlarge
the juirisdiction of the law-makint power by ;,ivin;r statutes
a retrospective interpretation.
It is a unifoi-m doctrine in this country well set-
tled by a lonp line of adjudicated cases that the legisla-
ture is the sole judqe of the policy and wisdom of retroac-
tive laws; and tie courts have no right to interfere. anId de0-
clare a statute void simply becaus'e it is retroactive,
unless it is in open violation of existin- rights, the secur-
ity of which are guaranteed by tT,,e constitution. Welch
v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149; Cooley Cont. Lim. 168.
ThYe underlying r~rincil-le of our jurisprudence is
justice and reason Therefore, when laws of a retroactive
ch-aracter are just and reasonable they are invariably sus-
tained by the courts) because there are numerous cases which
have arisen where it has been found to be absolutely necessary
to sustain laws of a retroactive character in order to render
anything in the nature of justije in that particular case
or to establish a reasonable precedent.
11 Tn determininq the vali'ity of a retroactive law
the question resolves itself into the criterion whT,,V-r or
noz t!he act is an ex post facto law, a law impairing the ob-
ligation of a contract, or a law divestinr vested ri ,;hts.
Vheth-er ,.he absence of any <enerai prohiibition in our con-
stitutions against T,,e distaLr)ance of irivate r'i;+ts, other
than those that are affected by impairin the obligations of
contracts, is to be attributed to the same cause wl'ich made
the Roman Law silent on the subject of parricide, because
it was not deemed wise to admit te possibility of such a
crime, or to an inherent difficulty in determining tlie just
limits of r'etroactive legislation, it is not easy to say.
It is certain among the restrictions fixed by the Constitu-
tion of the United States upon the states, there is none
which prevents the passage of retroslpective laws, however
unjust or impolitic excelt only wlere they would affect
existing contract6 or to attach to some previous act, -h
penal consequences which it did not possess when committed.
Put of course nD man can be deprived of his property without
due p1rocess of law'and a right to do a particular t1-ing has
been held by the courts to be a prolerty ri'?ht.
LAWf S AFFFCTT'": RFPMDTS.
The first great class of valid retroactive laws
That may be considered are those that affect thJ reiedy me'.-
ly. In Pact this class constitutes the g.'eater ]:-arT of
valid retroactive laws. Notwithstanding the fact that The
remedy in a rarticular case may be chanjged1 and made more
disadvantageous to the one seeking it, the lerrislature
has no right to deny any remedy whatever. A law may oper-
ate retrospectively by creating new remedies, by altering
or aholisT-hing old ones and substituting new onesTrovided
such le,-islation does not substanti :liy impair the right
which the remedy was intended to enforce. A person
cannot be deprived of The only remedy that he has to ,en-
force a ri,-Tgt by any retroactiv, I.w for the reason that such
an act would be clearly in violation of the constitution
by impairin.- CA*obligation or dejlrivin.' one of his prol erty
with:out due process of law. T-e authorities have gener-
ally agreed that an individual h as a vested right in a remedy
on a contract notwithstandinp the fact that it has heretofore
been advanced, with great force and eloquence that the rern, dy
could be destroyed without affecting the right. In sur-rort
of t}lis rrincil.le/ Daniel Webste.r once presen,ter] an able and
logical argument. At t},, present time, HoweVer, th(, courts
will not 6:tain any sucl, subtile reasoning. If a man
has a rig-ht and a remedy to enforce such riht, anrd the law-
making body destroy/s his remedy, can it be contended. for a
moment that his right is,also destroyed by th:e same overt
act of the legislature that destroys his remedy? For,
what is a right, from a legal point of view, but a claim
caT.tble of beinr enforced bDy law? And how is he going to
enforce a claim without tlhe means or remedy to do so?
It has been laid down as a maxim, or rather a catchword
that "no one can have a vested right to a remedy". This
however, is true only in a limited sense, and that is fthat
no one has a vested right to any particular remedy; but
it must be understood that a law which says that one shall
have no remedy to enforce an existing riht would clearly
impair the obligations of a contract. Some sufficient
remedy or means must be left to enforce th}e t} en existing
r i gh t.
The courts }'ave repeatedly sail th at -Tiere is no
vested right in a remedy. Put this statement is g'enerally
qualified to the effect that the remedy cannot be so changed
as to render it nugatory.
Ti1e rule regarding; remedies l.iid down by the
Supreme Court of' Pennsylvania in the case of Myers v. Irwin,
Second Sorg. ( F. 3t)8, seems to be a just and equitable view
of this branch of the law,as establishing, a I',roper limit
t;o legislative interference with remedies. The court said:
"The remedy constitutes tle essential -art of the legal ob-
ligation of the contract; but t.-e remedy is not a rart of
the contract itself )nor loes tle obligation of t 1-e contract
consist in any particular form of remedy. It is only nec-
essary that there should be an adequate subsisting remedy.
It is th:erefore believed to be competent for* the legislature
to change the remedy. If the remedy given be as good as
that which was taken away, the contract is not impairel".
The same view is substantially taken by the Inited States
Supreme Court. In rdwards v. Tearzey, 96 U.S. 9:5 it was
hold that t!,e remedy is a vital and material p art of the con-
tract. A statute of fraur3s embracing pre-existin parole
contracts whiich were notlrrevious toCAgenactment required
to be in writinr ,would affect its validity. So also a
statute declaring that thie wordI "ton" should in T rior 16 well
as in subsequent contracts, be held to mean Thalf or double
the weight before prescribed, would materially affect
previous contracts and t!erefore be void. And a statute
providin r that a previous contract of indebtedness may be
extinguished by a process of bankruptcy would be null and
void on the ground that it involved a comilete dischar~;e of
the contract. A statute forbidding te sale of any of a
debtor's property would destroy the remedy and tl- ner
be obnoxious to a sta/Le government. The foregoing illus-
trations have all been judicially determined, the courts
proceeding upon th e theory that all such laws comp letely or
so nearly destroyed the remedy that thiey vitally impair the
obligations of contracts. .Tut the class of statutes more
particularly to be considered here are those that have been
declared valid.
It is with much difficulty that a precise rule of
lawAbe deduced from AL-haotic mass of cases, that Jviould be
in conformity wit1 all; but it is practically safe to say:
that any particular remedy to which a party is entitled at
the time the contact is entered into, may be altered or abol.
ished by a subsequent statute, so that it will no longer be
availableIfor eitlher existing or subsequent contractsprovi-
ded it leaves a substantial remedy. The great riffi-
culty in this class of cases is to determine whether the rem-
edy 'as been altered or modifieri so as to materially alter
the obligation. It is impossible to lay down any rule tirde:"
which a large discretion of the courts cannot be used in de-
ciding each particuiar case) lax' ely on its own facts.
It is not easy to aprly a ri'-i1 rule for it is a very dif'fi-
cult task to determine wlfretl-er a rule of law in a general
cla.:s of cases abrogates a mere srecial r,,medyor desT..'oys
a substantial one and thereby impairs the very essence of the
obligation.
The remedy may be chianged, revised, and reformed,
and be render-d less expedient than tlhe one which the par-
ties had in contemplation when the contract was entered into,
Yet although a law may literally impair the enforcement of a
contract, it does not in legal contemplation materially injur-j
nor impair the obligation of the contract/ so long as an
efficient remedy remains. In the language of Judge Cooley
"It has been held that law's clanging remedies for the
enforcement of legal contrcacts will be valid even thou]h the
new remedy be less convenient tlan the old, or less prompt
and speedy". The courts have hold that a judment lien
may be abolic hed and the judgment creditor can be left to
depend upon his other remedies a., ainst the judgment debtor;
and it 'as also been geld that wv ere the charter of a bank
-ave it a sunmary reredy for the recove ry friom indorsers of
negotiable Tromissory notes,.. a different and piobably a more
expedient remedy than an ordinary proceeding, that it was
subject to repeal.
Anot 1 'er case of retroactive laws abolishing . par-
ticular remedy wh7ic - has been repeatedly sustained by the
courts, is in the case of abolishiny imrrisonment for debt.
The theory upon which the court sustains this class of stat-
utes)is t}hat imprisonment is a penalty for failure to perform
th-.e undertakingr, and is notApart of the contract itself.
They hold tbat the rigfht to imprison constitutes no part of
the contract, and the discharge of the person of the -arty
from imprisonment does not impair the obligation of the con-
tract, but leaves it in full force against '-is rrop-rtu., and
effects.
LAWS AFF]TTTT PPO(jDIT'P'.
Laws relatinj, to proce-lure whic have a reti'oactive
effect are generally held to be valid on the groud that
they merely change the remedy. ,eofislatures seem to have
considerable discretion in reard to substituting one mode
of action for anotlier in which the legal right;. oV t'he par-
ties are enforced, that have accrued prior to such ch-anges
or legislative enactments, as viell as to subsequent ones.
It is generalLy concede,- by all authorities,
th at the rules of plea-]in;: are witV-in the purview of the
lepislature so lono as it is exercised within the scope of
merely regulating rrocedure. Laws which provide that dif-
ferent parties may, or must be made parties to a suit, or
requiring certain defenses to be pleade'1 slecially are
permitted to act retros ectively. Also statutes -ivin-,
or taking away t he right of attachiment in certain actions
have been sustained, as affecting Trocedurre only, and applied
to Tprior causes of action. And statutes ch-langing the
manner in wh ich) sunmons may be served is valid as to past
transactions. Tn fact in all cases it may be laid down
that tl-:e rules +f procelure in for-ce at the time of the
suit are tie ones tnat ,-overn. The ri t must be concede'l
to V-e legislature to re%-ulate legal roceeding s by general
laws as best tl'ey can for the administration of justice and
the public good.
In tlh e early cases tlere -was some doubt as -b
whether <-e rules of v rocedur'e in force a; the time the
suit was comence-, or- those in foi',,e at the ti e of th e
trial should -overn; but the later decisions confirm the
view that the law of procedure in force at the -time of The
trial must govern regardless of when the action was com-
menced. Put it must be ke t in mind that any material
change of Trocedure that would absolutely de-rive a Iarty of
a remedy which he had at the creation of an obligation would
be void as impairing the obligation of the contract by com-
ipletely destroying the remedy.
RTLES OF EVIDENCE.
Laws relating to the rules of evidence, relate
peculiarly to the remedy, therefore in accordance with the
view taken of statutes affectini the remedy by the courts,
it is a well-recognized 1-1rinciple tT-at tThc rules of evidence
may be chanf-ed by retrospective statutes, provided tTat tle
thereby a cause of action is not destroyed or rerfdred
practically worthless. Rules of evidence may have refer-
ence to the manner in which evidence is offereldor it may
refer to the competency of certain evidence to prove certain
facts. qo long as the statute voes no furt]-er than to
regulate practiue in the courts, and does not impair the
rights of parties, it will operate upon past as well as fu-
ture transactionsand pending suits as well as those to be
instituted in the future. The competency of a witness
in a civil suit is to be determined by the law as it exists
at the time when he is called upon to testify regardless of
what may have been the rules at any previous time.
So also, are the rules of evidence regarding payers, doc-
uments etc. ,governed by laws in force at The time of trial.
It is evident that this class of laws relate merely to the
form of the remedy and do not materially impair - Te rights
of any party. A change of the rules of evidence is
g;enerally only a change of t}le means of accomplishing the
same end.
7XrIfP T TON LAWS.
So also, laws relating to exemptions in certain
cases are properly given a retroactive effect. Zut if
the amount of tze exemption is so groat as to render a
creditor's remedy under a contract nugatory the courts will
not sus'tain such a law, because it essentially impairs a
right the protection of which- is guaranteed by the constitu-
tion. laws that exemrpt property from taxation can at any
time be repealed by th-e state excelt suc'h as are contracts
with the state. Statutes exempting certain persons from
military service are at any time subject to change by the
same power that created thorn, the legislature. So long
as exemption laws do not impair the oblig7ation of a contract
they will be 6uslained. The later tendency of the
courts seems to be to :lace valid retroactive exemption
laws into very narrow limits, Judge Cooley remarks
however, "There is no constitutional objection to such a
modification of those laws which exempt certain portions of
the debtor's ]-roperty from execution, as shall increase the
exemption, nor to the modifications being made -aplicable to
contracts previously entered into". Cooley's Const. Lim.81.7.
This statement of Julge gooley's was undoubtedly in h'%,,rfmony
witli the feneral tren] of autl'ovities when it was written,
but as Thas been said before in view of the later -3ecision6
the rule prohibiting laws impairing the obligations of con-
tracts is arplied much more strictly to this clans of
statutes at the present time. -dwards v. IKearzey, 9t) U.S.
b9'_. And in Missouri str.itutes affecting exemition of
proi'erty from prior debTs are held to be invalid re-a'Iless
of thieir scope or extent. 91-e Missouri courts take the
view that it is imp.ossible for any law exempting property
from sale on execution to have a retroactive effect 'without
impairing the obligations of contracts. This is an extreme
view of this class of cases, and is the very opposite of that
laid down by Judge Cooley. Like all other principles of
law upon which widely varying positions are taken t1 -e
(thappy mear!'seems to be the prevailing position taken by the
courts.
STAT1TES AROLISHING DFF,NSTS.
Statutory enactments taking away certain classes
of defense have been elaborately considered by the courts,
esrecially those relating to the defense of usury and the
like. The general conclusion seems to be, with a few
sli ht variations, that the prevailino, current of authority
is in favor of tlie constitutionality of such legisiation.
0
It seems that any defense that is in tlhe nature of a penalty
can be obliterated by the legislature without infringing
upon any inherent -onstitutionai right.
Usury laws that prescribe a forfeiture or deprive
one of a legal remedy, for the reason that the contract
entered into is a usurious one may be rerealed. The effect
of such repeal is to authorize the enforcement of contracts
which when made were invalid and unenforceable under the
law as it existed at the time of such contract. In dealing
with this class of cases, the courts io on the theory that
a statute declaring, that an antecedent usurious contract
shall not be void is not a law impair-ing tle obligation of
contracts, but rathher one, the object of which is to give
force and obligation to contracts illegal and void Trior to
its passage. There certainly is no obligation that can
be impaired by a subsequent statute, in a void contract.
And the same concludion has been reached by the Courts
upon the ground that the forfeiture of either interest or
Iprincijal is not a rifght guaranteed to a party w-o agrees to
lay a rate of interest in excess of Th-at prescribed by Law,
but it is in th e nature of a ] enalty imposed upon the p0arty
who is to receive it. eing a penalty it forms no lartu
of the obligation of the contract, not can it be the sub-
ject, of , vested right. Mr. Justice Paige says: "The
defense of usury is in the nature of a -enalty or forfeiture,
and may be at any time taken away by t°he ler-islature in res-
pect to previous as well as subsequent contracts, without
trenching upon any vested riTIhts. A pro osition that a
party can have a vested ri in enforcing a r enalty or for-
feiture, against which it i, t},e office of a court of equity
to relieve is a legal solecism. Statutes of usury are
highly penal in their character, and the defense of usury
has always been regarded 1as an unconscientious defense,
and has never received the sanction of either court of law
or equity". Curtis v. Leviatt, 15 L1.Y., 229. Then it may
be laid down as a general rule that statutes which T:rohibit
or take away certain defenses not aprertaining to the merits
of the case but arise from some technical or oth er rule of
law are constitutional and do not impair vested rijhts.
LITTATTON LAWS.
Statutes which provide that no action shall be
maintained upon certain demands, unless suit be brought
within a limited time do not generaily violate the consti-
tutional prolibition of laws imr2airin- the obli7ations of
contracts. They merely modify the remedy and require a
party to bring his action within a certain time. If he
neglects to prosecute his action within the time that the law
specifies, truly it cannot be said that th-e law has worked
an injustice when the party by his own lalses has permitted
his cause of action to be determined by operation of law.
T1e law is settled beyond a doubt that the mere fact that
the cause of action accrued prior to the enactment of the
statute will be no objection to tlhe limitation. Solan v.
Watterson, 1/ Wall. 69b; Goai v. Zacher, l? Ohio, 56i4.
The courts base their decisions on the groundl of public
policy, and ri,71htly Too. If the legislature did not I-ave
l-ower to enact reasonable limitation laws whic' would cancel
stale demands, tl.ere would be no end to the multiplicity
of litigating obsolete demands. In order to affect
xisting causes of action, there must be allowed a reasonable
time'after the statute goes into effect, within which such
action may be brought; but it must be noticei that if tlne
legislatur',. shoul1 declare that a period already elaysed,
should bar a ri, ,.t of action This would be under coloi' of
reLulating arbitrarily a rule t'Pat would take away all remedy,
and in effect destroy ti contract within its jurisdiction,
and would be a mere abuse of i owerwhich the constitution
permits no legislature to indulge.
If a right of action Ias been barred by the
statute of limitations," it is beyond P Je rower of the leg-
islature to revive it, for as has been said by an eminent
jurist "sTatutes of 1mitation are st;-tutes of rep;ose".
Put the time witiul arl faction may be extended at any time
before it is completely barred, eitler in resioct to civil
or criminal actions, is unlimited. So also a statute -ro-
viding: "That whiere any cause of action has been or shall be
obstructed by a war, insurrection or rebellion, the time tha,
such obstrucTLion may have continued sl-lall not be reckoned
as any part of the time in wlich such right of action ou rIt
to have been prosecutel" Tas been Ield valid by t7-e courts.
The parties to a contract have no more a veste- rirht in
the time for the commencement of an action, than they have in
the form of the a.-tion to be commoced. Perry w. Anderson,
95 T T. S. 3 ,8 .
LAWS VALTDATTNrI C ,'RTAIN C1ONTRACTS.
The instances of t',e exercise of leg-islative
authority to sujpjly former omissions and legalize rast acts,
have been necessary as well as just, an- the courts have
recognized the expediency of such legislation, and generally
give ii, their unqualified sanction. In the language of
Judge Cooley "If the thing wanting, or" which failed to be done
and which constitutes the defect in the proceedings, is
something which the legislature might have dispensed w;ith
the necessity of by a prior statute, then a subsequent stat-
ute dispensing with itretrospectively must be sustained".
Cons. Lira. 3 1/. People v. McDonald, 69 N.Y. 362. In
accordance with this priinciple contracts of marriage/ which
by reason of some defect or informality were void/have been
legalized anI validated by subsequent statutes and such
statutes have been sanctioned by the court. Tf for instance
the statute law required, at the time the marriage relation
was entered into/that the ceremony must be yei'formel by a
person ordained ayid settled in 1,1e work of the ministry;
and contrairy to the law, it is performed by an itinerating
clcr.ymantn ta,, such a marriage the legislature enacts
a law/makin;< valid all marria;'es performed by an ordinary
minister. Such law, althou 7}' havin7 a retroactive
effect is valid and in violation of no constitutional prin-
ciple. It is a law founded upon justice and sound reason,
because its effect is merely to carry out the ori;inal inten-
tion of the parties concerned. And why should a rule of
law not be sanctioned which merely aids the parties, to
contract, in ca;rrying out an honest and legitimate 2;urpose.
This principle was evolved by an able bench in the case of
Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conri. 309, and was subsequently
sanctioned by a lon g line of well-considered, decisions in that
state. It has been reyeatedly cited as a leading case
throughout the country, and has almost invariably been .dopt-
ed by the different, courts.
Defective execut, ion of deeds and other contracts
can, constitutionally be remedied by subsequent legislative
acts. In the case of Tate v. Shoultzpoos, 14. S&r, 1 7,
a legislative act validating defective acknowledrments,
which did riot silecify that the wife had been separately ex-
amined for the purpose of determinin" her willingness to
sign a conveyance with her husband, was sustaine]. Ion-
firming acts of this c1 aracter are not at all uncommon.
The legislatures have repeate~ly remedied Iri'oceedings
and jurments of corrnissioners, and of justices of the
peace, who were not commissioned agreeable to the then ex-
isting laws, or wTen their powers ad ceased under different
circumstances and for divers reasons. It is peirfectly
clear th at remedial statutes of thlis tyl-e infringe upon no
constitutional provision nor divest any vested ric]ht, but
merely cure a defect in a proceedin; otlherwise fair and just.
It is an abuse of ter-ms to contend tloat this class of cases
involve the consideration of veste rights; for it is not
intended by a vested right that it shall be , right to do a
wrong; to take advantagrle of a mere sliT of form. When
and
the transaction is a bona fide one,Athe only element wanting
is simply the cancellation of some technical formality by
the legislature, it seems as though a party cannot obj;ct
to such validating acts on the groun] that 1 e has a vested
right not to do what he is in reality bound to do, and what
he has actually a~rreed to do. Surely this class of levis-
lation/curing defective contracts, cannot be objected to on
the ground that it impairs an oblimation of a contract,
because tlie very object of such legislation is to make po-
tent an inchoate ri-It under a contract, which is nothing,
I
more tl'an completing an obligation. Tle obligation exists
in fact from th-e time the contract is made and t! e legislative
act merely gives it existence in law as well as in fact.
The conclusion gleamed] from all te cases on this branch Uf
the law cannot be sta'ted better than in the lan:'uage of
Judge Cooley: "Legislative acts validating invalid contracts
have been sustained when these acts ;o no further than to
bind a party by a contract which he has attempter to
enter into, but which, was invLlid by rer_.son of some personal
inability on his part to make, or through neglect of some
legal formality, or in consequence of some in-redient in the
contract forbiddin by law, t!7e question tlhey suggest is one
of policy and not of constitutional law". Tn the case of
Blakely v. Farmers National Bank, 1/ Serg. & P. u4, a note
was given by the bank after it had forfeitel its charter
and a subsequent act of the legislature restored tIhe charter,
revived the corporation and legalized its past acts.
The court held tl e law to be constitutionai and the note
therefore valid. So also, in a statute autl-horizing the
placing of stamp-,s on instrurments from which th ey have been
omitted when execute.d, where not enforceabile whien unstam.iped,
is of this character, wether the statute requiring the stamp
renders the instrument absolutely void or only witholds Tthe
remedy. Harris v. Rutledgfe, l' Iowa, 388. Contracts void
at the time they are entered into !.ay be renderedvalid and
binling by a retroactive law, when their invalidity does not
result from some condition incoriorated within the contract,
or some stipulation purposely omitted, which the healing act
undertakes to supply.
AS AFFRICTITG CORPORATTONS
Our corporation law is saturated with the principle
that a charter granted by a state creates a contract between
Lhe state and the corporators which the former cannot violate
nor impair. This princille w3-ich was evolved in the
Dartmouth College case is now .upp.orted by a torrent of
authorities)and no court at this day will attempt to deny
that it is immoveably established. As a charter to a
private corporation is a contract it is within the constitu-
tional prohibition which prohibits the states from passing
a law which impairs the obligation of contracts.
Hence it is beyond the power of the state to repeal or ma-
terially annul such a corporate c.arter, unless the power
of amendment and~mp-eal hawebeen expressly reserved, or
unless all the parties consent to the chang e. All the
franchises, privileg'es, express and implied powers', necessary
and essential to carry out the corporate purposes are also
protected by the constitution. But the fact that a char-
ter of incorp-oration is a contractand entitled to all the
constitutional protections, does not prevent the state from
passing7 remedial and curative statutes correcting prior in-
valid proceedingTs of a corporation. The legislatureg
has the same power to ratify and confirm an irregularly organ-
ized corporation as thly have to create a new one.
So by an act confirming a consolidation between two railroad
companies.which was not binding when entered into~is valid.
Citing) Mitchell v. Reed, 49 Ill. 416.
Although the charters of stock corporations are
protected by the constitution to the same extent that other
contracts are, they are not exernt from the operation of gen-
eral laws, imposing upon tl.em such additional duties as the
legislature may deem necessary for the better security
of persons and rrorerty, and prescribinr- penalties for fail-
ure to comply with thieir requirments. Yithin this cat-
egory of statutes are those that relate to the exercise of
callings w'ich endanger life, limb or property. This clasS
of statutes does not derend for t'heir validity upon any
privileges conferred by the grant of a franchise.
The farthest that the cases have gone on this subject,
is to permit the legislature to regulate 1lIie carrying rates
of passengers and freight. Laws of this kind are clearly
within the regulation of the police power of the state, and
if such laws require tlie or~erations of a cor'roration to be
conducted in a manner different from that required by the
law as it existed when th-.e charter was granted there can be
no objection. A corporation is an artificial person
and it must be subject to the police regulations of a state
in the same manner and to the same extentin certain respects,
as a natural Yersonlwhen the safety and welfare of the
public demand-s it regardless of what mi7ht have been the
law when the act of incorporation was consummated.
Municipal corporations stand upon a different foot-
ing than private or stock corporations. Charters of such
corporations are not contracts, and are not p'rotected
by the constitutional prohibition a'Tiicable to contracts
like stock corporations are. ViJeni a legislative ac; is
in response to the petition of the inhabitants of a partic-
ular district, who ask for tl e construction of a municipal
government, tle grantin7 of the prayer is not for their
recuniary benefit, nor does the state receive nor the in-
habitants part with any consideration, express or implied.
The status of the individuals composing such corporations
is not changed in any respect concerning tTeir private prop-
erty. It is merely tl-e giving of certain functions of
municipal government to them. And as it is not rrotected
by the inviolability of contracts it may be amendel, altered,
restrictel or enlarged by the legislature without even con-
sulting the members composing it. Such corporations are
mere creatures of the legislature from which they derive all
the powers they possess. They have no ini}erent jurisdic-
tion to make laws or regTulations of Aovernment. Their
powers rest on a legislative grant and must be exTiressly or
impliedly conferred. The same rower that creates these
corporate privileges p rescribes the rules and declare.s the
formalities under which th-ey shall be called into action,
and in granting them does not divest itself, of th right)
at all times to modify or altogether abolish them in legis-
lative discretion.
AS APFECTING CRMIITAL LAWS.
Under the English constitution there has been fro-
qunet instances where the government has found itself unable
to vindicate its peace and dignity~without a new law rohib-
iting past acts, and prescribing 1-unisliments to meet the
exegency of the case. 'ut this mode of legislation is
so expressly p<rohibited by the federal constitution, that
in the United S tates the instances have been rare where there
has been any legislative intent to make crimes out of pre-
vious innocent acts. The violations of this constitution-
al prohibition have genei-ally been in other respects, and
are for the most part the result of clumsy legislative in-
tents to make the law ar-ply to future criminal acts only.
The clause of the constitution prohiibiting tiie
enactment of ex post facto laws first received a judicial
construction in the case of 7alder v. Bull, ) Dallas, 261).
Here it was lcijd down that this prohibition referred only to
laws of a criminal character; and the celebrated and ju-
dicious Judge Chase laid down the four fundamental rules
to determine ex post facto laws, that are today substantially
recognized by the courts in tesTin,- t}he validity of statutes
of this character. Tl-ie following are the ones which he
enumerates: "First, every law that makes an action,
done before, whichi was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action. Second, every law that aggravates
a crime or makes it -reater than it was when committed.
Third, every law that changes the punishment and inflicts
a greater runishment than the law annexed to the crime
when committed. Fourth, every law that alters the legal
rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense, in order to convict the offender". These four
test rules are now firmly established, with the exception of
the last. And upon this there has been conside'able con-
flict in the cases, and it is still of doubtful validity.
It is settled beyond a doubt that laws diminisYhing
the punishment or laws changing procecure merely are not ex
post facto. Put tI e courts have met with not a little
difficulty in determiningwhat is punishment within the mean-
ing of this rule. The question was thoroughly considered
by the courts in settling cases that arose from the late
rebellion. In the reconstruction of the southern
states, some of the new state constitutions or statutes
rrescribed a test oathi of previous loyalty as - irerequisite
to the exercise of privileFres of citizenship, or the carry-
ing on of certain designated callings. Thue takin- and
subscribing of the 'test oath was 7enerally made not only
a condition precedent to the exercise of the privileges,
or following the calling, but a failure to comply was made
a disqualification of those already in possession of such
rights and privileges. These provisions were objected
to on the ground that they made an act lunishable which was
not so when committed. The question ti-en arose whether
such disqualifications were punishments. The courts
have generally held that laws depriving one of the right
to pursue a lawful calling for some previous innocent act
was ex post facto because it was the infliction of a legal
lunishment for a past innocent act. Put merely to deprive
one of the elective franchise is not a punishment, for
the reason that votin7 is not an inherent right but simply
a Iprivilege subject to the regulation of the state.
The next difficult question that presents itself
in this class of cases is: What changes of iunishment will
be held to be an increase thereof? The rule laid down
by the N ew York Court of Appeals in Hartung v. People, Z->?U.Y.
and Ratzky v. People }9 -N.Y. is "That in any case where
reasonable men might deem a chang" to be an increase of
punishment the ,-ourts will declare the law affecting such
change ex post facto". The Supreme Court of Missouri
has recently established the rule, "That in order to effect
the diminution of punishment the new law must take away
some separable portion of the forme-' punishment".
These rules, however, are not safe discriminating tests
and the cases upon this subject seem to be decided largely
upon the particular circumstances of each. It is clear
however, t}" at a law decreasing the time of imprisonment
or the amount of a fine would be a diminution of punishment,
but tlhe great difficulty arises w1 ere there has been a sub-
stitution of' Tunishments. This is tl-e doubtful mar in.
Some laws cl~an-ing the mode of yunishment, havc been sus-
tained, while others apl:arently of a simil :r character have
been condemned by the courts. Therefore, to try to lay
down any distinguishing rule concernin " tThis class of cases
would be nothing more -han absurd presumption, under t]u
I1resent existing state of the law.
The same general laws of limitation that apply to
civil,causes of action are equally aprlicable in criminal
cases. And changes in criminal procedure are also held
to affect no substantial rirrlt of tI'e defendant, and are
valid. A law cTlanging the I:lace of trial to another co-bity
will govern the trial of Irevious offenses as well as those
committed subsequently. A citizen has no rioJlt to demand
a trial in a particular court, or by any particular mode of
procedure. Any clanr7e of r'rocedure is valid when it can
be made without imlairing the defendant's right to a speedy,
public, and efficacious trial, and without rendering it more
burdensome upon _him than it was under the law as it existed
when the crime was aller-eI to Thuve been comritted.
Statutes which give to the state a ,-rcater number of peremp-
tory challenges 'ave been sustained. Also changes in the
rpanner of sumnonin< jurors, and laws requiring a jury instead
of the court to assess damages are marc canjos in l 'ocedure
andI do not affect any substantiai richt.
Thus we conclude a brief view of a branch of our
j ur isprudencel the,pecuiiarities of whiOh were created by our
constitution; an- viich has recived not a small portion
of the judicial consideration during an hiu-ndred years of
constitutional interpretation.
